As a still quite young professor of classical philology at the University of Basel, Nietzsche taught a rather traditional, almost antiquarian, course on ancient rhetoric. The title of his 1872–73 lecture notes—"Presentation of Ancient Rhetoric" —clearly indicates that this time Nietzsche did not spoil for a fight or set out to uncover the hidden hybridity of origins as he did in his controversial book of the same year in which the origin of Greek tragedy is revealed as miscegenation between the (...) Dionysian and Apollonian principles. Rather his lecture notes exhibit an apparent commitment to following the traditional rhetorical... (shrink)

In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers draws a new framework in which to consider the mind-body problem. In addition to trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness – the problem of why and how brain processes give rise to conscious experience –, he thinks that philosophy, psychology, neuro-science and the other cognitive sciences should also pursue a solution to what he calls the “meta-problem” of consciousness – i.e., the problem of why we think there is a problem with (...) consciousness. My claim is that, while Chalmers’s project is generously ecumenical as well as beautiful in its meticulous detail, it is mistaken in its core assumption that the meta-problem can be formulated as an “easy problem” for science to solve. Furthermore, the project tilts the field toward illusionism against Type-B materialism, as far as physicalist solutions to the hard problem and the meta-problem are concerned. I will argue that Type-B materialism emerges unscathed from this dialectic. (shrink)

Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper (...) he characterizes non-conceptual content in a particular way and argues that it is plausible that it plays an explanatory role in accounting for certain auditory and visual phenomena. So he thinks that there is reason to believe that there is non-conceptual content. On the other hand, Fodor thinks that non-conceptual content has a limited role. It occurs only in the very early stages of perceptual processing prior to conscious awareness. My paper is examines Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states. (shrink)

Although personal relevance is key to sustaining an audience’s interest in any given narrative, it has received little systematic attention in scholarship to date. Across centuries and media, adaptations have been used extensively to bring temporally or geographically distant narratives “closer” to the recipient under the assumption that their impact will increase. In this review article, we review experimental and other empirical evidence on narrative processing in order to unravel which types of personal relevance are more likely to be impactful (...) than others, which types of impact (e.g. aesthetic, therapeutic, persuasive) they have been found to generate, and where their power may become excessive or outright detrimental to reader experience. (shrink)

I. Identitások és váltások -- II. Médiák és váltások.

Abstract: On several occasions (see e.g. Principles I/48) Descartes claims that sensations, emotions, imagination and sensory perceptions belong neither to the mind or to the body alone, but rather to their union. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s definition of “thought” given elsewhere, which classifies the same events as modes of a thinking substance, and hence depending for their existence only on minds. In this paper I offer an interpretation, which, I hope, will restore the coherence of Descartes’s dualist theory. (...) I argue that the ‘special modes’ of thinking are special because they are the immediate effects of the body on the mind. They thus depend for their existence on the body because of the general metaphysical principle that “Nothing comes from nothing”. Understood properly, this principle does not contradict the principle about the distinctness of substances. (shrink)

Phenomenality and accessibility are two aspects of conscious experience. “Phenomenality” refers to the felt, experiential aspect of experience, and “accessibility” to a cognitive aspect of it: its availability in general to thought processes, reasoning, decision making, etc. In this paper, I present a dilemma for theorizing about the connection between them. Either there is a conceptual connection linking phenomenality and accessibility (i.e., it is not possible to conceive of a phenomenal experience that is not cognitively accessible for the subject) or (...) there is none but then the empirical evidence will – for principled reasons – be unable to decide the exact nature of the relationship between the two. (shrink)

Symmetric generalized Galois logics (i.e., symmetric gGl s) are distributive gGl s that include weak distributivity laws between some operations such as fusion and fission. Motivations for considering distribution between such operations include the provability of cut for binary consequence relations, abstract algebraic considerations and modeling linguistic phenomena in categorial grammars. We represent symmetric gGl s by models on topological relational structures. On the other hand, topological relational structures are realized by structures of symmetric gGl s. We generalize the weak (...) distributivity laws between fusion and fission to interactions of certain monotone operations within distributive super gGl s. We are able to prove appropriate generalizations of the previously obtained theorems—including a functorial duality result connecting classes of gGl s and classes of structures for them. (shrink)

Relevance logics are known to be sound and complete for relational semantics with a ternary accessibility relation. This paper investigates the problem of adequacy with respect to special kinds of dynamic semantics (i.e., proper relation algebras and relevant families of relations). We prove several soundness results here. We also prove the completeness of a certain positive fragment of R as well as of the first-degree fragment of relevance logics. These results show that some core ideas are shared between relevance logics (...) and relation algebras. Some details of certain incompleteness results, however, pinpoint where relevance logics and relation algebras diverge. To carry out these semantic investigations, we define a new tableaux formalization and new sequent calculi (with the single cut rule admissible) for various relevance logics. (shrink)

The dissertation addresses the mind-body problem, and in particular, the problem of how to fit phenomenal consciousness into the rest of reality. Phenomenal consciousness - the what it’s like feature of experience - can appear to the scientifically inclined philosopher to be deeply mysterious. It is difficult to understand how the swirl of atoms in the void, the oscillation of field values, the firing of synapses, or anything physical can add up to the smells, tastes, feelings, moods, and so forth (...) that comprise our phenomenal experience. There is a series of arguments - the so-called “Conceivability Arguments” - that spells out this puzzlement. If this arguments are successful then there is no place for phenomenal consciousness in a completely physical reality. The main conclusion of this dissertation is that the Conceivability Arguments are all dependent on a flawed premiss, and that therefore these arguments - perhaps the most powerful among anti-physicalist arguments - all fail. Conceivability Arguments begin with the premiss that we can conceive of any physical or functional facts obtaining without there being any phenomenal experience at all. This is sometimes expressed by saying that zombies (i.e., beings that are our physical and functional duplicates, but possess no phenomenal experiences) are conceivable. The claim that zombies are conceivable does not have to do with our powers of imagination, or our psychological abilities, but rather with the nature of physical and phenomenal concepts. The reason that zombies are claimed to be conceivable is that each person’s thinking about phenomenal properties is completely dependent on her first person acquaintance with her own experience. From this assertion of conceivability it is inferred that zombies are genuinely possible. And this conclusion is incompatible with physicalism as that doctrine is usually understood. I argue that these arguments all fail; they are refuted by a master argument that I call “the Zombie Refutation.” The reason they fail has to do with the very nature of phenomenal concepts that gives rise to the conceivability of zombies. Because of the special nature of these concepts, the principle underlying the Conceivability Arguments - that principle that links conceivability and possibility - turns out to be self-refuting. Thus, the zombies that the Conceivability Arguments supposedly demonstrate to be possible, return to undermine those very arguments; a fitting revenge. (shrink)

The dissertation deals with problems in "logic", more precisely, it deals with particular formal systems aiming at capturing patterns of valid reasoning. Sequent calculi were proposed to characterize logical connectives via introduction rules. These systems customarily also have structural rules which allow one to rearrange the set of premises and conclusions. In the "structurally free logic" of Dunn and Meyer the structural rules are replaced by combinatory rules which allow the same reshuffling of formulae, and additionally introduce an explicit marker (...) for the application of the rule---the combinator. The dissertation gives syntactic extensions of such systems introducing conjunction and disjunction . Cut elimination is proved for these systems. ;Syntactic systems as a rule are accompanied by a semantics which interprets them. The extended systems are supplied with semantics using algebraic methods. First, the Lindenbaum algebras are formed, and then these algebras are represented in an algebra of sets. This gives a so called Kripke-style semantics for the systems. The representation for the distributive extension utilizes well-known techniques; it uses sets of prime filters and set theoretical operations on them to deal with conjunction and disjunction, plus a ternary accessibility relation to accommodate the intensional operators as fusion and implication. The representation theorem is proven generally, i.e., for arbitrary sets of combinators using the "squeeze lemma" of Routley and Meyer. ;The non-distributive calculi require a different representation since union and intersection are distributive. Two previous representations for lattices are overviewed, and a modification of the Hartonas-Dunn representation is successfully augmented with the intensional operations. Instead of sets of filters, sets of pairs of minimally inconsistent filters and ideals are used and the representation theorem is proven. The representation results provide soundness and completeness for the systems. The dissertation also investigates properties of dual combinators , proving a series of lemmas about dual combinatory systems not being Church-Rosser and being inconsistent. Combinatorially definable classes of lambda-terms are considered as well. (shrink)

Ao editar seu terceiro número, Aoristo – International Journal of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Metaphysics reafirma seu compromisso de contribuir com a divulgação científica e com o incremento dos estudos de filosofia fenomenológica, de filosofia hermenêutica e de metafísica na Universidade Estadual do Oeste do Paraná – Unioeste, bem como, modestamente, na cena filosófica brasileira e estrangeira. Como afirmado já em seu projeto editorial, Aoristo reforça seu escopo de realizar-se como espaço de acolhida de parceiros nacionais e internacionais. O propósito é (...) reunir instituições e pesquisadores que promoveriam não apenas o estreitamento mútuo de laços acadêmicos, mas também o fomento e a consolidação de ambiente de pesquisa propício à internacionalização e à qualificação da produção intelectual junto aos campos temáticos aqui circunscritos.Conjugando esses princípios, o presente número traz, antes dos artigos acolhidos em fluxo contínuo, um dossiê dedicado ao filósofo alemão contemporâneo Wilhelm Dilthey (1883-1911). (shrink)

The network concept is increasingly used for the description of complex systems. Here, we summarize key aspects of the evolvability and robustness of the hierarchical network set of macromolecules, cells, organisms and ecosystems. Listing the costs and benefits of cooperation as a necessary behaviour to build this network hierarchy, we outline the major hypothesis of the paper: the emergence of hierarchical complexity needs cooperation leading to the ageing (i.e. gradual deterioration) of the constituent networks. A stable environment develops cooperation leading (...) to over‐optimization, and forming an ‘always‐old’ network, which accumulates damage, and dies in an apoptosis‐like process. A rapidly changing environment develops competition forming a ‘forever‐young’ network, which may suffer an occasional over‐perturbation exhausting system resources, and causing death in a necrosis‐like process. Giving a number of examples we demonstrate how cooperation evokes the gradual accumulation of damage typical to ageing. Finally, we show how various forms of cooperation and consequent ageing emerge as key elements in all major steps of evolution from the formation of protocells to the establishment of the globalized, modern human society. (shrink)

In this commentary I criticize David Rosenthal’s higher order thought theory of consciousness . This is one of the best articulated philosophical accounts of consciousness available. The theory is, roughly, that a mental state is conscious in virtue of there being another mental state, namely, a thought to the effect that one is in the first state. I argue that this account is open to the objection that it makes “HOT-zombies” possible, i.e., creatures that token higher order mental states, but (...) not the states that the higher order states are about. I discuss why none of the ways to accommodate this problem within HOT leads to viable positions. (shrink)

Bei der umfassenden Thematik der Relation zwischen Philosophie und Pädagogik liefert die Philosophie von Kant ein ganz besonders reiches und vielschichtiges Beispiel für die Reflexion. Kants Philosophie steht in einer dreifachen Beziehung zur im wahren und ursprünglichen Sinne genommenen Schulphilosophie. Erstens gilt der Gesamtkorpus der Kant’schen Philosophie als bewusste und kritische Überwindung der Leibniz-Wolff’schen Metaphysik . Zweitens gilt die Kant‘sche Philosophie, auch wenn sie in diesem wahren Sinne des Begriffs selber keineswegs als Schulphilosophie aufgefasst werden kann, in ihrer spezifisch ausgearbeiteten (...) Ausführung als Überwindung des Leibniz-Wolff’schen Systems auch als Schulphilosophie. Und drittens kann die Kant’sche Philosophie, auf ihre Art, versteht sich, auch als neue positive schulphilosophische Alternative gelten, für welche sie etwa durch ihre systematische, vollständige Ausführung der Problemkreise, der konsequent zur Geltung gebrachten hermeneutischen und didaktischen Aspekte oder durch die vollständige sprachliche Kohärenz wie prädestiniert ist. Unter diesem Aspekt unterscheidet sich die Relation Kants zum Leibniz-Wolff’schen System von derselben bei Schelling oder eben Hegel. Hegel geht auch regelrecht auf die vielfache historische Bedeutung dieser gewaltigen Schulphilosophie ein, auf einer ähnlichen Linie hebt Schelling sogar hervor, dass selbst noch die Fehler dieser Schule von unvergleichlichem Nutzen für die Philosophie waren, weil es ohne sie zu keiner späteren Blütezeit der Philosophie hätte kommen können. Für Kant bedeutet diese umfassende Schulphilosophie weder die Vergangenheit noch den Gegenpol, aber auch nicht die niedrige Stufe der hohen Philosophie, für ihn bedeutet diese große Schulphilosophie einen denkerischen Rahmen, der einerseits in jeder seiner Einzelheit transformiert werden muss, während die neue hohe Philosophie andererseits den Rahmen der Schulphilosophie bei ihrer Konstitution in Anspruch nehmen muss. Dies ist nur möglich, weil das Bedürfnis nach Philosophie zwar nicht identisch mit dem nach Schulphilosophie ist, es in breiten Flächen aber tatsächlich abdeckt. (shrink)

Nietzsche's vision of modern democracy includes an aspect which many tend to neglect given the historical experience with totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. Precisely on account of its triumphant progress, 'irresistible' democracy, according to Nietzsche, tends to instrumentalize the activities of its enemies. This is a claim made by a philosopher whose work Alfred Baeumler and Georg Lukács considered an extreme political archaism. For a long time no serious objection was raised against this absurd verdict. The present article attempts (...) to show how Nietzsche's universalistic approach assigns a definite place to democratic systems and specifies why these systems are of special relevance for the universal-emancipatory development of humankind It argues that by stating the prophylactic character of the democratic system Nietzsche reaches the very core of his philosophy whereby he differs markedly and positively from other political philosophers. The difference lies precisely in the fact that for Nietzsche a given political system is not an ultimate value or objective, but simply an occasion to realize universal human ambitions. Nietzsche's political philosophy, therefore, establishes a distinction between various political systems evaluating them in terms of their prophylactic potential for the purposes of universal-emancipatory development. /// A visão nietzschiana da democracia moderna inclui um aspecto que muitos intérpretes tendem a esquecer devido à experiência histórica do século XX com sistemas totalitários. Para Nietzsche, é devido ao seu triunfante progresso que a democracia 'irresístivel' tende a instrumentalizar as actividades dos seus próprios inimigos. Curiosamente, esta é a pretensão de um filósofo cuja obra Alfred Baeumler e Georg Lukács consideravam como sendo uma forma extrema de arcaísmo politico, veredicto este contra o qual durante muito tempo nenhuma objecção se levantou. Objectivo dopresente artigo, porém, é precisamente mostrar até que ponto a abordagem universalista de Nietzsche atribui aos sistemas democráticos um lugar determinado e ao mesmo tempo especifica a razão pela qual estes sistemas ocupam um lugar privilegiado no que se refere ao desenvolvimento universal-emancipatório da humanidade. A tese do autor, com efeito, é a de que é precisamente ao afirmar o carácter profíláctico do sistema democrático que Nietzsche alcança o verdadeiro núcleo central da sua filosofia, facto esse mediante o qual ele claramente se distingue de outros pensadores polítcos. A diferença está precisamente no facto de para Nietzsche um determinado sistema político nunca constituir em si um valor último ou objectivo, antes encontra o seu valor na ocasião que porporciona para a realização de ambições humanas universais. A filosofia politica de Nietzsche, portanto, estabelece uma distinção entre uma diversidade de sistemas políticos propondo uma avaliação dos mesmos de acordo com o seu potential profiláctico no que se refere aos objectivos de um desenvolvimento universal e emancipatório. (shrink)

Nietzsche saisit l'une des nouvelles fonctions de l'art d'une manieére divinatoire. Lorsqu'on "facilite" la vie de cette facçon, cela n'est pas me é me apparement identique aux arts de distractions provoqueés par les formes anteérieures des connaissances. Faciliter la vie, ce n'est plus un acte naif ou naturel, mais le reésultat d'une deécision: par la creéation de cette distance, l'art a pu remplir de nouvelles fonctions, tout en sauvegardant ses propres qualiteés speécifiques. Nous pourrions formuler par des termes plus modernes: (...) satisfaire aux nouveaux besoins. L'art facilitant la vie en ce sens-laéapparait sous une forme plus geéneéraliseée en tant qu'un "e|acircum|tre faisant volte-face". Ceux qui connaissent la formulation de Walter Benjamin qui aboutit aécette ideée, pourront reéveéler l'importance de cette geéneéralisation. (shrink)

Bei seiner -- wie vorausgeschickt -- strategischen Bestimmung des ganzheitlichen Standortes der Philosophie in ihrem Entfaltungsprozeß verfährt Hegel in der Differenzschrift zweigleisig. Auf der einen, mehr sichtbaren und auch in der philosophischen Tradition gründlicher und tiefer rezipierten Ebene liefert er die berühmte und bei jeder Bestimmung der Philosophie und des »philosophischen Bedürfnisses« bis heute überhaupt viel zitierte Definition, wonach in dem neuen welthistorischen Weltalter der Entzweiung ein qualitativ neues Bedürfnis nach der Vereinigung der Gegensätze, d.h. nach »Philosophie« artikuliert wird. Weil (...) es nicht zum direkten Gegenstand unseres Versuchs gehört, deuten wir nur in unausgeführter Form an, wie und warum wir einen spezifischen Verdacht gegenüber dieser allseits ohne jegliche Kritik akzeptierten Definition hegen. Dieser Verdacht gründet sich einerseits auf der Tatsache, daß diese Definition ein starkes Zugeständnis an die aufkommenden romantischen Evidenzvorstellungen enthält. Im Anbetracht von Hegels stets artikulierter antiromantischer Einstellung dürfte es direkt auffallen, warum er gerade bei einer so unmittelbaren Kategorisierung des allerneuesten Weltalters eine in ihrer Struktur und in ihren Wertvorstellungen »romantische« Ansicht vertritt. Versucht man ferner den Gehalt dieser Einschätzung interpretativ noch weiter zu rekonstruieren, so läßt sich dieser Gehalt bald geradezu antihegelianisch auslegen. Denn eine »Vereinigung«, deren »Macht« unterging und eine »Einheit«, deren Macht und Geltung deshalb wiederhergestellt werden muß, klingt nicht nur als romantische »Grundbefindlichkeit«, sondern läßt sich auch als eine Auffassung verstehen, die den Grundintentionen der Geschichtsbetrachtung auch des jungen Hegel diametral widerspricht, denn wo ließe sich bei ihm eine mögliche Periode, oder zumindest eine Antizipation der möglichen »Einheit« in seinen Gedanken nachweisen? (shrink)

Bei seiner -- wie vorausgeschickt -- strategischen Bestimmung des ganzheitlichen Standortes der Philosophie in ihrem Entfaltungsprozeß verfährt Hegel in der Differenzschrift zweigleisig. Auf der einen, mehr sichtbaren und auch in der philosophischen Tradition gründlicher und tiefer rezipierten Ebene liefert er die berühmte und bei jeder Bestimmung der Philosophie und des »philosophischen Bedürfnisses« bis heute überhaupt viel zitierte Definition, wonach in dem neuen welthistorischen Weltalter der Entzweiung ein qualitativ neues Bedürfnis nach der Vereinigung der Gegensätze, d.h. nach »Philosophie« artikuliert wird. Weil (...) es nicht zum direkten Gegenstand unseres Versuchs gehört, deuten wir nur in unausgeführter Form an, wie und warum wir einen spezifischen Verdacht gegenüber dieser allseits ohne jegliche Kritik akzeptierten Definition hegen. Dieser Verdacht gründet sich einerseits auf der Tatsache, daß diese Definition ein starkes Zugeständnis an die aufkommenden romantischen Evidenzvorstellungen enthält. Im Anbetracht von Hegels stets artikulierter antiromantischer Einstellung dürfte es direkt auffallen, warum er gerade bei einer so unmittelbaren Kategorisierung des allerneuesten Weltalters eine in ihrer Struktur und in ihren Wertvorstellungen »romantische« Ansicht vertritt. Versucht man ferner den Gehalt dieser Einschätzung interpretativ noch weiter zu rekonstruieren, so läßt sich dieser Gehalt bald geradezu antihegelianisch auslegen. Denn eine »Vereinigung«, deren »Macht« unterging und eine »Einheit«, deren Macht und Geltung deshalb wiederhergestellt werden muß, klingt nicht nur als romantische »Grundbefindlichkeit«, sondern läßt sich auch als eine Auffassung verstehen, die den Grundintentionen der Geschichtsbetrachtung auch des jungen Hegel diametral widerspricht, denn wo ließe sich bei ihm eine mögliche Periode, oder zumindest eine Antizipation der möglichen »Einheit« in seinen Gedanken nachweisen? (shrink)

Comment rapprocher Diderot et Watteau, qui représentent deux conceptions artistiques foncièrement différentes? C'est dans une perspective interdisciplinaire, au croisement de la théorie de l'art, de la critique d'art et des études littéraires que les essais rassemblés dans le présent recueil proposent une réflexion peu conventionnelle sur les perceptions de l'image au xvii siècle. Au fil de notions difficilement définissables, telles que la mélancolie, le rêve, la grâce ou la légèreté, aptes cependant à s'ériger en concepts esthétiques généraux, les études réunies (...) ici visent à tracer les contours d'une poétique de l'image. À travers ces catégories, qui peuvent en effet servir de lien entre Diderot et Watteau, l'ouvrage prétend porter un éclairage nouveau sur les questions artistiques et contribuer ainsi à la réinterprétation des notions propres à la théorie de l'art française de l'époque classique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Thinking about thought -- Everything's an inference -- Out of context or the situation -- The rational unconscious -- The formerly dismal science -- Should you think like an economist? -- Spilt milk and free lunch -- Foiling foibles -- Coding, counting, correlation, and causality -- Odds and Ns -- Linked up -- Experiments -- Ignore the hippo -- Experiments natural and experiments proper -- Eekonomics -- Don't ask, can't tell -- Thinking, straight and curved -- Logic -- Dialecticism -- (...) Knowing the world -- Kiss and tell -- Keeping it real -- Whom to believe. (shrink)

Glossolalia (“speaking in tongues”) is a rhythmic utterance of word‐like strings of sounds, regularly occurring in religious mass gatherings or various forms of private religious practices (e.g., prayer and meditation). Although specific verbal learning capacities may characterize glossolalists, empirical evidence is lacking. We administered three statistical learning tasks (artificial grammar, phoneme sequence, and visual‐response sequence) to 30 glossolalists and 30 matched control volunteers. In artificial grammar, participants decide whether pseudowords and sentences follow previously acquired implicit rules or not. In sequence (...) learning, they gradually draw out rules from repeating regularities in sequences of speech sounds or motor responses. Results revealed enhanced artificial grammar and phoneme sequence learning performances in glossolalists compared to control volunteers. There were significant positive correlations between daily glossolalia activity and artificial grammar learning. These results indicate that glossolalists exhibit enhanced abilities to extract the statistical regularities of verbal information, which may be related to their unusual language abilities. (shrink)

In Born to Wonder, Alister McGrath, a prolific Oxford scholar, scientist, and theologian, explores the deepest mystery at the heart of life itself. Life is a gift. We never asked to be born. Yet here we are, living in this strange world of space and time, trying to work out what it's all about before the darkness closes in and extinguishes us. We are adrift on a misty, grey sea of ignorance, seeking a sun-kissed island of certainty, on which we (...) might hope to find clear answers to our deepest and most poignant questions. What is the point of life? Why are we here? And what is it about us that makes us want to ask these questions? As far as we know, we're the only species on earth that asks these questions, and dares to hope that we might find an answer. It seems that we are born to wonder, not merely to exist. From time to time, all of us find ourselves overwhelmed by a sense of awe or mystery, often when confronted with the beauty of nature, whether it is a mountain stream or the vast expanse of ocean waters. That is when we see a flicker of a grander vision of reality, perhaps lying beyond the horizons of our experience. It is as if, for only a moment, a veil is removed, and we catch a half-glimpsed sight of a promised land, waiting to be mapped and explored. This sense of wonder fuels much of humanity's creativity and its search for understanding. (shrink)

Together with its kissing cousins ‘authority’ and ‘obligation’, legitimacy is a notion that should arouse apprehension. Governments that are legitimate have the ‘right to rule’, to demand obedience from their citizens or subjects. It is at least partly correct to say that this authority is independent of the content of the laws or commands issued by those invested with it, that the authority of a law or command is a reason for obeying it regardless of its contents or their merits. (...) As widely construed, reasons of this kind are conclusive in that they leave those subject to authority with but two choices: either obey the command or disassociate from the political association of which authority is a constitutive feature. Theories of ‘passive’ and ‘civil’ disobedience add the third option of disobedience to commands judged to be unjust but on condition of peaceful submission to the penalty assigned. (shrink)

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences (...) and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.

Hormonal changes associated with the human menstrual cycle have been previously found to affect female mate preference, whereby women in the late follicular phase of their cycle (i.e., at higher risk of conception) prefer males displaying putative signals of underlying genetic fitness. Past research also suggests that romantic kissing is utilized in human mating contexts to assess potential mating partners. The current study examined whether women in their late follicular cycle phase place greater value on kissing at times when it (...) might help serve mate assessment functions. Using an international online questionnaire, results showed that women in the follicular phase of their menstrual cycle felt that kissing was more important at initial stages of a relationship than women in the luteal phase of their cycle. Furthermore, it was found that estimated progesterone levels were a significant negative predictor for these ratings. (shrink)